Supreme Court's 1999 Ortiz decision, 7 the limited fund concept is moribund for resolving future claims. 8 Seventh, class actions may compromise Seventh Amendment rights. 9 And last, the class action is dead. ' If this were not grim enough, the country's senior-ranking and highly eminent proceduralist ends his paper with a four-paragraph substantive solution to the futures problem." Clearly, we are in trouble. I join Professor Hazard in his dour pessimism. He correctly and poignantly describes the consequences for asbestos claimants of the Supreme Court's repudiation of the Anmhem 1 2 and Ortiz settlements. Although the Court's rejection of these settlements vindicates due process, it also delays, denies, or devalues justice for thousands of genuinely injured claimants, a practical consequence that largely has 13 been overlooked in the commentary on these decisions.
I part company with Professor Hazard's gloom, however, in two respects. Although a consequence of the Amchem and Ortiz decisions may be a decline in the volume of class litigation1 4 a proposition I 7 Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 119 S. Ct. 2295 (1999) . " See Hazard, supra note 2, at 1910 (noting the Court's disapproval of the "limited fund" concept).
9 See id. at 1914 (noting the potential Seventh Amendment right to jury trial issues inherent in some mass tort litigation). ' (noting that the resolution of asbestos claims is "back to square one in the judicial system"). 4 The vitality and volume of class action litigation runs in cycles, often in reaction to court decisions. Thus, the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 inspired an increase in class action litigation in the ensuing decade. However, three Supreme Court decisions in the early 1970s slowed the volume of class litigation by imposing various requirements on class plaintiffs regarding the financing of notice costs and limiting the ability to aggregate damages to satisfy the amount in controversy requirement. 2See Hazard, supra note 2, at 1904 (noting that the issues raised by mass torts of the airplane crash sort are similar to those dealt with by courts in many types of modem litigation).
21 See REPORT ON MAss TORT LITIGATION, supra note 1, at 35 ("The mirror image of these questions arises from the desire of defendants to achieve closure---to buy 'global peace'-by resolving all present and future claims at once.").
Indeed, the willingness of the plaintiffs' lawyers to negotiate the fate of the future claimants sets the stage for both the Amchem and the Ortiz deals. For a brief history of the negotiations leading to these settlements, see generally Linda S. 1 This proposal combines federalization and the modem administrative state with a dab of private enterprise for good measure. This proposal also suggests that, notwithstanding our President's pronouncements, the era of big government is perhaps not over yet.
With all due respect, and understanding very well the complexity of the futures problem, Professor Hazard's proposal nonetheless embodies another Rube-Goldberg-like contraption that cobbles together various schemes that individually make sense. It kind of sounds good. He has, of course, neglected to tell us why this proposal would appeal to Congress, as opposed to all other failed attempts to federalize products liability law.3 2 Because I agree with Professor Hazard that prior attempts at dealing with the futures problems have been ineffectual-if not illegal-I propose an alternative idea to privatize effectively the resolution of future claims.
'o The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules of the Judicial Conference of the United States apparently has chosen to do nothing about the futures problem, at least in the short run. Thus, the conclusion of the Working Group on Mass Tort Litigation included the following:
Even greater difficulties are presented by the issue of certifying a class of plaintiffs who will experience injury only in the future. Although the Advisory Committee has held resolution of these problems in abeyance, it is likely that realistic, workable answers will be found only through a combination of legislation and implementing procedural rules.
REPORT ON MASS TORT LIGATIoN, supra note 1, at 58. The idea to privatize the resolution of future claims is derived from a few propositions that frame the practical problems involved in these claims. These include the necessities to: (1) resolve future claims as a part of any latent injury mass tort settlement; (2) sever future claims from current claims resolution; (3) estimate future claims accurately; and (4) create an independent entity to process future claims. As I will discuss below, 3 these practical problems can be addressed by utilizing current procedural mechanisms coupled with economic incentives.
First, defendants will not settle a latent injury mass tort litigation unless the deal includes some disposition of future claims.3 4 If latent injury mass torts are to be settled or resolved under judicial auspices-or through legislative initiative, for that matter-the resolution must include some disposition of future claims.
Second, the resolution of future claims must be accomplished separately from the resolution of current or "inventory" claims. Hence, plaintiffs' attorneys cannot be involved in simultaneous negotiations for the resolution of current and future claims. If a latent injury mass tort involves future claims, that fact must be identified early in the litigation and the future claims should be severed from the litigation to avoid any possibility of conflicts of interest, sell-outs, or taint of collusion.
Third, some entity other than the parties, their attorneys, and their experts should be responsible for determining the number of future claimants. If we have learned anything from three decades of mass tort litigation, it is that the actors involved in latent injury mass torts have proven to be notoriously bad at estimating the universe of future claimants. 35 -" See infra Part I1I.C (discussing the implementation of private future claims processing).
See supra text accompanying notes 1 & 21 (discussing the importance of the future claims problem). The miscalculation of the numbers of future claimants has a cascade effect because the underestimation of future claims will quickly exhaust a settlement fund to the detriment of other future claimants. Thus, any system for dealing with future claims must include some mechanism for inducing the most accurate estimate of the universe of future claimants.
There are several reasons why the current system results in the miscalculation of the number of futures claims. The actors involved in mass tort settlements-including the judges who must approve the fairness of those settlements-have few incentives to determine accurately the estimates of future claims. Such estimates typically are provided through expert testimony.
The major motivation for providing a reasonably plausible estimate of future claims is to induce the court's approval of the settlement. However, hardly anyone involved in a mass tort settlement (other than an objector or a guardian ad litem for future claimants) has a great incentive to challenge the estimate.36
After the court approves a settlement, if the money runs out, neither the parties nor the court especially cares about the future claimants. The defendants contribute to a fund to be administered by a claims facility; the plaintiffs' attorneys take their fees and have little hands-on management of the settlement fund; and the court largely is out of the picture. A miscalculation of future claims becomes the problem of the claims administrators or fund trustees.
Fourth, any resolution of future claims must involve a professional administrative claims facility. Plaintiffs, defendants, attorneys, and the judiciary do not want to administer claims, nor do any of these actors have the expertise to do so. Professional commercial entities should process future claims and, with proper economic incentives, future claims resolution should bring into existence such entities.
500,000 claims).
Objectors may or may not have a great incentive to challenge the parties' estimates of future claimants. Moreover, to assert this type of challenge, the objector would have to retain an independent expert witness to perform the actuarial studies to provide another estimate. In theory, a court-appointed guardian ad liten has the greatest incentive (if not a fiduciary duty) to determine independently an accurate estimate of future claims. Performance of this task, however, assumes that the court, in appointing the guardian, provides resources sufficient to allow the guardian to hire an independent expert witness to future claims--an assumption that may have no basis in fact.
B. Framing the Legal Problems
Apart from practical problems, the resolution of future claims entails an array of legal issues, many of constitutional dimension. These include:
(1) defining a future claimant, (2) standing, (3) statute of limitations, (4) notice, and (5) consent 7 Indeed, Professor Hazard's despair about future claims arises chiefly from his contemplation of these issues.
The first two problems-defining the future claimant and standing-are related. Objectors in latent injury mass tort cases have argued that future claimants have no actual injury and therefore can have no standings an Article III "case and controversy" objection 9 In this version, the future claimant is a phantasmagoric figment of the imagination for whom no one can provide remediation. More starkly, according to this view, the future claimant is an oxymoron: the future claimant is no claimant. Any resolution of the future claims problem, then, must resolve this conundrum by acknowledging the existence and legal force of future claims. 40 Future claimants also run afoul of limitations problems because of the intrinsic nature of latent injury. Of all the problems implicated in the resolution of future claims, limitations problems seem the easiest to rectify, either by party consent or legislative action.
The problem of notice also has dogged resolution of future claims: simply stated, how can unknown and unidentified future claimants have notice of the resolution of their claims? Even more problematic, how can any court approve a settlement of future claims, consistent with due process, without adequate notice to future claimants?" It UNTVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVEW [Vol. 148:1919 becomes clear from these queries that resolution of future claims must in some way deal with notice. Finally, any resolution of future tort claims must be based on consent. Constitutional due process requires no less.
C. Implementing Private Future Claims Processing
The idea for privatizing the resolution of future claims is simple. It is based on three fundamental propositions: (1) that future claims in latent mass tort litigation can be resolved in a manner that is fair and consistent with due process; (2) that parties in the present litigation and the judiciary are not the best actors to resolve future claims property, because among other reasons they lack incentives to do so; and (3) that economic incentives will encourage private vendors to efficiently, expeditiously, and fairly resolve future claims. Here is how privatization would work: First, any mass tort litigation filed in federal court would be subject, under local rules or CJ.R.A. (Civil Justice Reform Act) plans, to complex case tracking.4 Mass tort litigation involving latent injury claims immediately would be sent to a judge.
Second, the judge would ascertain, from the pleadings and in conference with the parties, whether the litigation involved a latent injury mass tort. If so, the judge would exercise power, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to sever the future claims from the litigation. 44 Third, the judge would meet and confer with the parties regarding the remainder of the litigation,4 which would consist of current claims requirement would not effect the disposition of this case, we express no opinion on the need for notice . . . in this case."); Amchem, 521 U.S. at 628 ("Because we have concluded that the class in this case cannot satisfy the requirements of common issue predominance and adequacy of representation, we need not rule... on the notice given here."). See FED. R. CIV. P. 16 (empowering courts to direct pretrial conferences).
only. The plaintiffs and defendants could proceed to trial or negotiate a settlement, but the parties would deal only with current claimants. Fourth, the judge-under a local rule authorizing such referralwould refer the future claims to "future claims vendors "46 for a bidding process. The court would appoint a guardian or other fiduciary for the future claimants and maintain continuing jurisdiction over the future claims. The court would pre-screen and approve future claims vendors. These vendors would have to demonstrate sufficient capitalization and expertise in administering future claims funds. Vendors could demonstrate adequate capitalization through multiple mass tort funds, thereby spreading risk among pooled assets.
Fifth, the interested future claims vendors would prepare and submit bids to the defendant for administering future claims involved in the latent injury mass tort. This bid would include a guaranteed payment to the claimant, based on current values for like claims resolved in the tort system, and adjusted for the time value of money (or inflation or escalation). The bid also would include the vendor's estimate of the number of claims, administration expenses, and profit. The bid would include details relating to claims administration, including mechanisms for providing notice, proof of claims, and payouts.
Sixth, the defendant could accept or reject any bid from a future claims vendor.
Seventh, the defendant and the vendor would present their agreement to the court for approval. The guardian or fiduciary for the future claimants would present an independent report to the court concerning the substantive and procedural sufficiency of the bid. The court would assess the agreement for substantive and procedural sufficiency. Consent of future claimants to a fair, court-approved future claims fund would be implied.
Finally, when the defendant has accepted and the court has approved a vendor's bid, the defendant would deposit the agreed fund and be relieved of any further obligation to future claimants. Future claimants could not sue the defendant in the tort system but rather would be referred to the vendor. The future claims vendor would administer claims under the terms of the agreement. 46 Some federal courts, by local rule or under the authority of CJ.R.A. plans, authorize referral of cases to alternative dispute resolution vendors. See S.D. T. LOCALR. 20B (allowing the district court to "refer a case toADR," and authorizing the court to choose an Alternative Dispute Resolution provider if the court believes an ADR provider is suitable for the case).
IV. BENEFITS AND FEASIBnITiY
Who would benefit from privatizing future claims resolution, and why would privatization work?
The privatization of future claims resolution would work because it would call into existence commercial vendors with an economic incentive to maximize profit by accurately estimating the universe of future claimants and by minimizing transaction costs in administering claims. Any vendor with bad business judgment would fail; no such vendor would ever gain court approval as a listed vendor for referral.
Future claimants would benefit because they would be guaranteed compensation for valid claims, benchmarked by recoveries for similar current claims in the tort system. No future claimant, upon the proof of a claim, would receive less value than any current claimant, adjusted for the time value of money. In addition, future claimants might actually recover a higher percentage of their claim's value because privatization would serve to eliminate the high transaction costs endemic to mass tort recoveries, particularly attorneys' fees.
Defendants benefit in four ways. First, defendants would achieve global peace. Second, defendants benefit by a competitive bidding system to establish the size of the fund. Hence, competitive vendors will have to make very accurate estimates of the number of future claimants, the value of those claims, and the total amount of the fund necessary to pay those claims. They also have to accurately estimate a reasonable profit margin for the award of the contract. Third, defendants benefit by paying out a fund calculated by economic actors with an interest in reducing high transaction costs. Finally, defendants benefit by getting out of the future claims administration business.
Future claims vendors-a new business venture that would come into existence under this proposal--will benefit by being able to bid competitively for the business of administering future claims, and by making a profit from this enterprise. Under this system, future claims vendors would be penalized only to the extent that they made poor business judgments in estimating the number of future claims or in administering the claims payments.
The judicial system will also benefit. This proposal accomplishes the three values of Rule 1: to ensure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 17 While vendors may be able to discharge their obligations by declaring bankruptcy under this proposal, this would not appear to pose a significant risk for future claimants. The proposal's provision for strong judicial oversight, as well as the "repeatplayer" factor, would effectively constrain this problem. resolution of disputes. In addition, the judicial system benefits by unpacking the resolution of future claims from the resolution of current claims and by maintaining continuing supervisory jurisdiction over future claims to ensure the legal sufficiency of the vendor agreement.
Finally, plaintiffs' lawyers benefit by being able to litigate or settle present claims, unimpaired by conflict of interest and collusion problems inherent in simultaneously representing future claimants. Plaintiffs' lawyers can sue or settle for the full current value of such claims and take full attorneys' fees. CONCLUSION This is, of course, a semi-shocking proposal, but no more shocking than Geoffrey Hazard's federalized product liability-insuranceworkmen's compensation statute. Nor is it more shocking than stretching the limited-fund class action, doing an end-run around the bankruptcy laws, or massaging the interpleader rule.
This proposal would solve a host of problems. It cuts the head off the beast: it severs the future claims from the current claims. This ought to deal with Amchem and Ortiz issues.
This proposal lets plaintiffs' lawyers take their fees for current claims-in whatever fashion they choose to resolve them-but it does not let plaintiffs' lawyers get greedy and use future claims as a negotiating chip to inflate gross settlement values and attorneys' fees.
This proposal provides an administrative means to compensate future claimants with recoveries superior to those available in the tort system, reducing transaction costs and attorneys fees.
This proposal solves the defendants' problem of perpetual litigation.
This proposal largely takes the judicial system out of the loop, with the exception of the limited supervisory role of approving a vendor's bid for the future claims business.
Finally, this proposal has the advantage that it does not require the passage of much new legislation, modification of existing rules, or interpretation of Rule 23 in ways that Justice Souter would not approve.
In almost every respect, existing federal and local rules could implement this proposal. The major innovation would be court approval of future claims vendors. Many federal courts already
